

Joint 8th and 9th Review Meeting  
of the Contracting Parties to  
The Convention on Nuclear Safety

20 - 31 March 2023  
Vienna, Austria

Summary Report

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Vienna, 31 March 2023

## **A. Introduction**

1. The 8th Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (the ‘Convention’) was originally planned to be held from 23 March to 3 April 2020. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Contracting Parties decided not to hold the Review Meeting as planned but instead to organize a Joint 8th and 9th Review Meeting in 2023, as is described in the Compendium attached to the President’s Report of the Organizational Meeting for the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Review Meetings.
2. The Joint 8th and 9th Review Meeting (‘Joint Review Meeting’) of the Contracting Parties to the Convention was held, pursuant to Article 20 of the Convention, at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria from 20 to 31 March 2023. The President of the Joint Review Meeting was Ms Dana Drábová from Czechia. The Vice Presidents were Mr Carl-Magnus Larsson from Australia and Mr Manwoong Kim from the Republic of Korea.
3. This report summarises the key activities and outcomes of this Joint Review Meeting based on the discussions of Contracting Parties held in the Country Group Sessions and in the Plenary Sessions.

## **B. Background**

4. The Convention entered into force on 24 October 1996. As of March 2023, ninety States and one regional organisation were Contracting Parties to the Convention, though seven Signatory States had not yet ratified it. Of the ninety-one Contracting Parties, thirty-one had nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation and/or in permanent shutdown, of which sixteen have additional plants under construction or are considering them. A further two Contracting Parties were constructing their first NPPs while fifty-eight Contracting Parties had no NPPs.
5. The Joint Review Meeting had the highest level of participation by Contracting Parties to date. Eighty-one of the ninety-one Contracting Parties participated, these being: Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; China; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Korea, Republic of; Kuwait; Latvia; Lebanon; Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Mexico; Montenegro; Morocco; Netherlands; Niger; Nigeria; North Macedonia; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Paraguay; Peru; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of Moldova; Romania; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Thailand; Tunisia; Türkiye; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; United States of America; Uruguay; Viet Nam; and Euratom.
6. Ten Contracting Parties did not attend the Joint Review Meeting, namely Albania, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Myanmar. Bangladesh, Paraguay and Senegal did not attend their Country Group sessions. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) had each requested an invitation to attend as an Observer, as is permitted by Article 24(2) of the Convention. Invitations were extended, but they did not attend.
7. Following the practice of the United Nations General Assembly and the decisions of several UN organizations, the Contracting Parties decided to defer a decision on the Credentials of

Myanmar, pending guidance from the United Nations General Assembly, thereby leaving the seat of Myanmar empty. While Myanmar did not attend the meeting, the President acknowledged Myanmar's commitment to the spirit of the CNS.

8. At the Organizational Meeting in October 2021, Contracting Parties decided that the first week of the Joint Review Meeting would consist of seven Country Groups. Each Contracting Party was then assigned to one of the seven Country Groups in accordance with the practice described in Annex III of INFCIRC/571. Each Country Group included countries with nuclear power programmes of different sizes, as well as countries with no NPPs.
9. Four Contracting Parties, namely, Libya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Uruguay did not submit a National Report for the 8th review cycle. The National Report of Cuba was posted after the original starting date of the 8th Review Meeting.
10. Twenty-four Contracting Parties did not post any written questions or comments for the National Report submitted for the 8th review cycle, namely Albania, Armenia, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Paraguay, Republic of Moldova, Senegal, Syrian Arab Republic, and Uruguay.
11. Contracting Parties had submitted National Reports for the 9th review cycle describing specific measures being taken by them to address the Articles of the Convention and to respond to challenges identified at previous Review Meetings and by International Peer Review Missions. The National Reports were to be submitted by 5 August 2022 for review by other Contracting Parties, whose questions and comments were to be submitted by 18 November 2022, to be answered by 17 February 2023.
12. Eight Contracting Parties did not submit a National Report for the 9th review cycle, these being Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Bolivia, Congo, Libya, Morocco, and Nigeria. A further nine Contracting Parties submitted their National Report for the 9th review cycle after the deadline, these being Cuba, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Myanmar, Niger, Paraguay, and Ukraine; the report of Lebanon being submitted just prior to its own Country Group session during the Joint Review Meeting.
13. Thirty Contracting Parties did not pose any written questions or comments prior to the Joint Review Meeting, these being Albania, Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Denmark, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Senegal, Serbia, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay.
14. Of the 5112 written questions that had been submitted by Contracting Parties for the 9th review cycle, responses were provided on time to 4896 (some of which had been responded to without technical substance), responses were provided late to 144 and no responses were provided to 72. All but twelve Contracting Parties responded to all their questions. Although Kuwait responded all their questions, this was done during the Joint Review Meeting. Only one Contracting Party failed to respond to any of its questions, that being Madagascar. In this context, Contracting Parties reiterated the need to respond to the questions and comments in substantive technical manner in order to preserve the integrity of the peer review process.
15. Similar statistics on National Reports, questions and answers for the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting can be found in the Compendium on the Information on the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Cycle attached to

the President's Report of the Organizational Meeting for the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Review Meetings, paragraphs 15-18.

16. At the time of the Joint Review Meeting, twelve Contracting Parties had made their National Reports publicly available on the IAEA website, these being Australia, Canada, Czechia, Italy, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States of America. All National Reports submitted to the Joint Review Meeting will be posted on the IAEA website 90 days following the adjournment of the meeting unless a Contracting Party objects in respect of its own National Report. In accordance with this practice, all National Reports submitted in preparation for the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting had been posted on the IAEA website in 2020.
17. Most Contracting Parties had made their National Reports publicly available on the websites of their national regulatory bodies prior to the Joint Review Meeting. Several Contracting Parties had also made their questions and answers publicly available on their national websites.

## **C. Overview of the Review Process**

### *Opening Plenary Session*

18. The Joint Review Meeting was opened by Ms. Dana Drábová, who had been elected at the Organizational Meeting to serve as President. The President welcomed the over nine hundred participants and noted that States that had signed the Convention but who had not yet adhered to it had been invited to attend the opening plenary, that part of the final plenary where the Summary Report is adopted and the press conference. Four of the seven such States attended, namely Egypt, Monaco, Philippines and Sudan; however, Algeria, Israel and Nicaragua did not attend.
19. The President noted that representatives of the media had been invited to the same sessions, which would also be webcast. She also reminded the meeting that the Plenary sessions would be recorded and interpreted into all official languages of the Agency.
20. The Director General of the IAEA, Mr Rafael Mariano Grossi, then welcomed the delegates, noting that it was extraordinary to see the CNS community back again. He noted the work done by Contracting Parties in updating their National Reports while waiting for the opportunity to present them at a Review Meeting. He emphasised the extraordinary circumstances that are influencing the way in which we now work, inter alia the situation in Ukraine, noting that it is important that the Joint Review Meeting reflect on this and consider how to avoid a nuclear accident in times of armed conflicts. He suggested that the Joint Review Meeting ask how fit for purpose the safety instruments are and how we should put them to good use in this situation.
21. Mr Grossi noted that the 2022 General Conference had once again encouraged Member States “that have not yet done so, especially those planning, constructing, commissioning or operating nuclear power plants, or considering a nuclear power programme to become Contracting Parties to the CNS.”
22. Mr. Grossi closed by asking that the Joint Review Meeting stay focused on the robustness of design, implementation of timely solutions for long term operation, innovation in decommissioning and waste management aspects of nuclear safety in order to take the greatest benefit from gathering so many experts from a wide range of Contracting Parties. He concluded that the Convention on Nuclear Safety is a very important mechanism in maintaining nuclear safety and that the challenge is global.

23. Ms. Drábová thanked Mr Grossi for his opening remarks and noted that the Plenary was fully devoted to achieving his aims. She acknowledged the work that had been done after the 8th Review Meeting had been postponed and then combined with the 9th Review Meeting as a Joint Review Meeting. She paid tribute to the work of the previous Presidencies on which the preparations for this Joint Review Meeting were based.
24. She noted that nuclear power should be safe, well-regulated and environmentally sound and that attendees should be aware of the importance of nuclear safety in all circumstances, with the highest level being sought at all times. She recalled the key objective of the Convention, as expressed in Article 1 of the Convention, to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. She emphasized that the upcoming two weeks should focus on the technical elements of nuclear safety, respect the spirit of the Convention to cooperate and find consensus and not lose sight of the purpose of Review Meetings. She concluded that the Convention remains more than ever relevant and that the deliberations of the Contracting Parties will assist the Secretariat and its Member States to strengthen the global nuclear safety regime.
25. Vice-President Kim summarized past actions of the Presidency and Officer team to prepare for the 8th Review Meeting and then prepare for the Joint Review Meeting during the COVID-19 pandemic. He noted that since there had been no evaluation to conclude the 8<sup>th</sup> review cycle, this would be combined with the 9<sup>th</sup> review cycle.
26. Vice-President Larsson reported on the deliberations of the Working Group that had been formed by the Organizational Meeting of October 2021 to discuss proposals to bring to the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). Although agreement was to be sought in the Working Group, it had no mandate to decide on any of the proposals being discussed. Participation in the Working Group was open to all Contracting Parties. It met twice in 2022 and discussed at length eight proposals that had been submitted, four of which were supported for submission to the Joint Review Meeting, with three others being submitted following revision and one being deferred.
27. Vice-President Larsson further described how the OEWG will operate at the Joint Review Meeting, the proposals submitted having been gathered into four groups:
  - a. Amendments to INFCIRCs to reflect/consolidate current practice;
  - b. Recording actions and decisions during the pandemic for future reference;
  - c. Improving clarity and consistency of Review Meeting findings;
  - d. Optimizing and strengthening the efficacy of the review process.

## **D. Country Group Discussions**

28. During the Joint Review Meeting, the Country Groups met for four and a half days and discussed the National Reports submitted by the Contracting Parties in their Country Group, with each Contracting Party providing answers to the supplementary questions raised in the discussion. Discussions in the Country Groups were generally good with a lively and frank exchange of views. Some discussions benefitted from the presence of Contracting Parties that were not members of that Country Group. The members of each Country Group identified a number of Challenges, Suggestions, Good Practices and Areas of Good Performance to be shared with all Contracting Parties.

### *Conduct of Country Group Discussions*

29. Each Contracting Party that gave a presentation in its country group received questions. Following discussion, the Country Groups subsequently finalized and agreed by consensus each Country Review Report.

30. One Contracting Party informed that it could only partially fulfil its commitments and responsibilities under the Convention with respect to ensuring nuclear safety in its installations due to the ongoing armed conflict in the country.
31. The General Committee (President and two Vice-Presidents, Chairs of Country Groups) met daily to discuss the previous day's experiences, including issues raised in Country Groups; Good Practices awarded and procedural matters.
32. One recurring topic was the number of Good Practices and Areas of Good Performance that had been proposed before the Joint Review Meeting, either in the National Reports themselves or by the reviewers of those National Reports. The Joint Review Meeting had continued the practice begun at the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting of applying the definition of Good Practice strictly but instead recognizing improvements made in a Contracting Party by awarding an Area of Good Performance. The General Committee discussed the possibility that for future review meetings, the Contracting Parties may wish to apply some form of control in order to limit the number of such proposals.
33. Another recurring topic was consistency between Country Groups in the awarding of Challenges, Suggestions and Good Practices.

#### *Identification of Good Practices, Areas of Good Performance, Challenges & Suggestions*

34. The Country Groups identified a total of fifteen (15) Good Practices, though two of these were identical, being for collaboration between regulators. The Country Groups also identified a total of 241 Areas of Good Performance, 201 Challenges and 61 Suggestions.

#### *Response to the extraordinary circumstances in Ukraine*

35. Some Contracting Parties described that they had undertaken additional actions in relation to emergency preparedness considering the impact of a possible radiological release in light of the situation in Ukraine due to the armed conflict. Some Contracting Parties have recognized the challenge of protecting nuclear installations and associated safety related infrastructure from armed attacks against a nuclear installation devoted to peaceful purposes. At the same time, some Contracting Parties are voluntarily providing material and financial support to aid in maintaining the safety of nuclear installations affected by the armed conflict.

## **E. Major Common Issues**

### ***Challenges from the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting***

36. The Contracting Parties at the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting had decided that future Review Meetings should continue to have one or two topical sessions open to all Contracting Parties organized so as not to interfere with the Country Group sessions and directly linked with the objectives of the Convention. The Joint Review Meeting held two such topical sessions, on Ageing Management and Safety Culture, that are summarized in Section F of this report.
37. The Contracting Parties at the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting had requested that starting with the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting, the President issue a survey to evaluate the effectiveness of the

changes to the review process. A survey was performed in 2020 and discussed at the Organizational Meeting for the Joint Review Meeting, at which Contracting Parties did not express a need to repeat the survey for the Joint Review Meeting.

38. The Contracting Parties at the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting had requested that the Agency conduct a technical study and review the possibility of video conferencing certain Country Group sessions using a secure platform as supplemental assistance to facilitate greater participation. The report of the technical study was tabled at the 8<sup>th</sup> Organizational Meeting, which deferred any decision to the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting (now the Joint Review Meeting). Discussion in the Open-Ended Working Group at the Joint Review Meeting noted that, while technically feasible, the issue of confidentiality had been identified in the Agency's report as an element of risk and decided to maintain the current arrangements with closed Country Group sessions without videoconferencing.
39. The Contracting Parties at the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting had requested that, starting with the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting, the President continue to web-stream the opening plenary session as well as the part of the final plenary session at which the final version of the Summary Report is adopted, as well as the press conference. This was approved.
40. The other recommendations made by the Contracting Parties at the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting were responded to at the Organizational Meeting for the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting, as had been requested.
41. The President of the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting had recommended that Contracting Parties report at the 8<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting on progress made against nine Major Common Issues that had been identified in paragraph 33 of the President's Report. The Contracting Parties with NPPs addressed these Major Common Issues in their National Reports under relevant articles of the Convention. A few Contracting Parties without NPPs also addressed the challenges in their National Reports.

#### ***Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety***

42. Contracting Parties at the 7<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting reaffirmed that the principles contained in the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety should continue to be reflected in the actions of Contracting Parties to strengthen nuclear safety, and in particular when preparing National Reports on the implementation of the CNS, with special focus on Article 18 as well as other relevant articles, such as 6, 14, 17 and 19.
43. The National Reports by all the Contracting Parties that operate NPPs confirmed that this had been with one exception (though that Contracting Party described in its presentation how it meets the principles of the Vienna Declaration). Some Contracting Parties that do not operate NPPs described how they comply with the principles of the Vienna Declaration.

#### ***Major Common Issues Arising from Country Groups Discussions***

44. A number of common issues emerged from the Country Group discussions that were presented for discussion in the Final Plenary. These common issues are summarised below together with the some of the elements that were considered in the discussions. In all cases, Actions are proposed. The President recommended that Contracting Parties take these issues into account when preparing their National Reports for the 10<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting, by describing the current national situation and actions taken or planned.

#### Managing extraordinary circumstances impacting the safe operation of nuclear installations

45. Regulatory bodies should share their experiences on how to ensure regulatory resilience; to better understand strategies, needs and ways to adapt and respond to unexpected challenges. Regulatory bodies should develop and maintain appropriate procedures to deal with extraordinary circumstances and to implement lessons learned for future regulatory enhancements.

**Action:** Contracting Parties are encouraged to develop and maintain strategies, approaches and contingency plans in managing extraordinary circumstances, such as Covid-19 pandemic, extreme natural disasters, armed conflicts, etc.

#### Strengthening national regulatory capabilities taking into account new and innovative technologies

46. International cooperation between regulatory bodies should be strengthened to exchange experiences on regulatory strategies and approaches addressing innovative and advanced technologies. The capabilities of regulatory bodies to, among other things, address innovative and advanced technologies should be strengthened. This could include exchanges of experiences on regulatory strategies and approaches for addressing such technologies. To be responsive to future changes, regulatory bodies, as appropriate, should be provided with qualified and sufficient human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities, while ensuring an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion and utilization of nuclear energy.

**Action:** Contracting Parties should establish durable capacity building programmes to align regulatory capabilities with future needs.

#### Fostering international collaboration

47. Contracting Parties consider that international collaboration, including in the context of the SMR design review, contributes to harmonization and standardization. International cooperation on safety standards development strengthens international harmonization to achieve a high level of nuclear safety.

**Action:** Contracting Parties are encouraged to foster international collaboration and, as appropriate, to participate in different types of collaborative schemes for the review of SMR designs.

#### Foster international peer review missions and timely addressing of findings

48. Contracting Parties consider that self-assessment is the main instrument to improve safety and operational reliability of nuclear installations. Regular international peer review missions (OSART, IRRS, etc.) encourages the application of IAEA safety standards. Timely implementation of findings and a follow up mission is a prerequisite for a successful completion of a peer review. Sharing experience regarding peer reviews with other regulators and licensees, as appropriate, is a key element of the process to improve nuclear safety globally.

**Action:** Contracting Parties are encouraged to invite on regular basis IAEA peer review missions, including follow-up missions to confirm the status and timely implementation of peer review findings.



### Possible impact of global climate changes on the safe operation of nuclear installations

49. Global climate change may have an impact on the safe and reliable operation of nuclear installations including their siting. External hazards are usually addressed within a Periodic Safety Review or similar instrument. For example, water resources are essential during both operational states and accident conditions. The increase of frequency and intensity of extreme weather-related events and their combined impact should be considered.

**Action:** Contracting Parties are encouraged to address possible impact of climate change on nuclear installations, in particular those related to the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather conditions.

### Securing reliable supply chains

50. Reliable supply chains are a prerequisite for a safe and reliable operation of nuclear installations. Supply chains are changing. New/alternative suppliers represent a challenge for both the licensee and the regulator. Non-conforming, counterfeit, fraudulent or suspect items (NCSFI) are a persistent issue in the supply chain.

**Action:** Contracting Parties are encouraged to share experience in securing supply chains and exchange information on practices in addressing NCSFI.

### Strategies for ageing management in support of the operation of nuclear installations

51. Contracting Parties recalled the obligation for comprehensive and systematic safety assessments to be carried out for existing nuclear installations throughout their lifetime from design to decommissioning. In this context, some of the Contracting Parties recalled Principle 2 of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. Broad exchange of information on managing operation including long-term operation (LTO) of nuclear installations, utilizing the experience gained from the International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned (IGALL) program, should be a part of this. Actions are ongoing to improve the effectiveness of ageing management programs in support of LTO, including research programs.

**Action:** Contracting Parties are encouraged to exchange experiences on the implementation of their aging management strategies and effectiveness of ageing management practices from design to decommissioning, with a special focus on newly identified ageing processes on specific SSCs, when applicable.

### Strengthening emergency preparedness and response arrangements and fostering cross border collaboration

52. Some Contracting Parties are reviewing and/or updating emergency preparedness and response arrangements particularly on transboundary impacts to address the consequences of a potential nuclear accident at nuclear installations in light of the situation in Ukraine due to the armed conflict. Some Contracting Parties are actively monitoring the situation and providing information to the public and media. Diligent cross border cooperation contributes to effective and harmonized EPR. Participation in joint exercises on bilateral and/or multilateral level as appropriate also enhances national EPR. In this regard Contracting Parties recalled the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

**Action:** Contracting Parties are encouraged to strengthen diligent cross border cooperation, including participation in joint emergency exercises, and to foster cooperation between experts in nuclear and radiation safety in relation to emergency response.

## **F. Topical Sessions**

53. The 8th Organizational Meeting of Contracting Parties had decided to recommend Ageing Management and Safety Culture for consideration as topical sessions for the 8th Review Meeting, that were then carried forward to the Joint Review Meeting.
54. Two topical sessions were held during the second week, the topics being Ageing Management and Safety Culture. Vice-President Kim introduced and closed both sessions; the first was moderated by Dan Dorman of USNRC and the second by Petteri Tiippana of STUK. Presentations were made by invited panellists, followed by a panel discussion then a plenary discussion. A more detailed description can be found in the President's Report.

## **G. Experiences in responding to the COVID-19 Pandemic**

55. The Contracting Parties had been encouraged to include information on the pandemic and its potential impacts within the CNS framework in their National Report submitted for the 9th review cycle; the National Presentation Template having been updated for this purpose to structure discussion in the Country Groups. No summary has been prepared of the information provided, though the pandemic was discussed at the OEWG within a different context.

## **H. Proposals to improve the processes of the Convention**

56. The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was established at the opening plenary session and was chaired by Vice-President Larsson. Six proposals were submitted by the Contracting Parties and discussed during the OEWG meetings.
57. Mr. Larsson welcomed the participants and indicated his expectations of open and collegiate discussions, with a focus on strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of work carried out under the terms of the CNS, ultimately aiming at strengthening nuclear safety worldwide. The meetings were well attended and comprised presentation and discussion of the proposals, leading to agreement of the wording of recommendations to be submitted for approval by Contracting Parties during the Final Plenary on Wednesday 29 March 2023.
58. The Contracting Parties decided the following:
  - a. to define an 'Area of Good Performance' and incorporate into INFCIRC/571/Rev.7 as described in Annex 3 of the OEWG Chair's Report.
  - b. to require National Reports be submitted to the secure CNS website as electronic files not exceeding 30 MB to be reflected in INFCIR/572/Rev.6 and INFCIR/571/Rev.7.
  - c. to clarify Rule 11 of INFCIRC/573/Rev.6 to permit an Organizational Meeting to decide, inter alia, whether to organize no more than two topical sessions at the Review Meeting.
  - d. to introduce into INFCIRC/571/Rev.7 information on management of CNS matters when an in-person meeting cannot take place, as described in Recommendations 5 and 6 of the OEWG Chair's Report.

- e. to enhance Officers' training to help clarify review meeting findings as described in Recommendation 7 of the OEWG Chair's Report.
  - f. to continue to maintain in-person closed Country Group sessions, without videoconferencing.
59. Canada, supported by France and the United Kingdom, put forward a revised proposal regarding the establishment of a working group aiming at maintaining long term balance of effectiveness and efficiency of the CNS. This revised proposal was discussed and agreed with further changes.
60. The Contracting Parties agreed that the 10<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting will be held from 13 to 24 April 2026. It was noted that interval between this Review Meeting and the 10<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting exceeds the three years interval and the Contracting Parties agreed that this should not create a precedent for future review meetings.

Ms. Dana Drábová  
President  
Joint 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Review Meeting  
of the Contracting Parties to  
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